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Abstract

The function of political power in modem states is analyzed for two modes of operation: an exclusionary and an inclusionary mode. The traditional sovereign
power, the monarch, represents the form of political power that is dominated by
the exclusive mode, because the sovereign has the rights of life and death, and
subjugates its citizenry with oppressive force. The transition out of this mode occurs during the liberal revolution, when power is divested from the king and invested in the populace. Once popular sovereignty is in place, the newly allowed
system of capitalism results in the control of the labor class, by excluding them
from property but necessitating social cooperation. Furthermore, new disciplinary
methods are introduced which maintain control of the population in the absence of
an absolute sovereign and link necessary cooperation to production. It is argued
that this was all enabled due to a system of racial exploitation, and hence we
should add the fact of exclusion by race into our understanding of overall political
power. The conclusion based on these studies is that political power is a composition of exclusion and inclusion in the liberal state. Finally, the possible future of
removing the exclusive component of liberalism is evaluated by considering contemporary liberal theory.

4'Political Structure and Continuing Reality"
Vandiver Chaplin

Political power appears at the nexus of population, land, and resources, and is the revealing sign of any political organization. Under this view, a taxonomy of political structures has
been constructed on the basis of how power is constituted and invested within a populace and its
specific territory. All political power operates in relationship to a political organization, which
we shall also call a political structure, and much can be made of these relationships. First, we
shall see that power always has a certain conception of the individuals and entities at which it is
directed; it can oppose a population with objective force, or compose it, making proper subjects.
And since all political power is connected to a polity and structure, it can be conceived on the
basis of how it treats individuals in relationship to the core structuring agency. Does power
openly coerce its citizens and deny them any rights? Or does it acknowledge basic rights, and if
so, is it really subservient to those rights? It has an associated social conception of the subject,
which varies with history. By connecting these two concepts, the power and the polity, we shall
see that all political power is a combination of exclusionary and inclusionary modes. This is
composite powec
The relationship of power to poIity will be examined only for coincidental content, not
for a causal structure. The mere collocation of a particular composition of power and a particular
political structure in history is suficient for us to define a basic relatiemhip between the structure and the dominant mode of power, whether it is exclusive, inclusive, or some combination.
Traditional critiques of western civilization's middle and late forms tend to give primacy to the

historical form of organization as the necessary precursor to any exercise of power, rather than
the presence of some power, and the limits thereof, within a populace as the precursor to organization. The correct order can be difficult to determine, because in actual fact each is likely to
have a significant historical trend--we can explain many trends in history equally as well with
either organization or power as the causative factor. Organization is, in this view, is driven by
material factors like land, climate, population, and out of this, organization around a particular
king or dictator occurs. The created structure and its vested interests is then what we ought to
understand to understand power, under this view. However, conflictual historiography bases political structures on historical domination, on raw power of some group over others, and history
is in fact a product of this struggle.' To debate between the two would be going beyond the
scope of this thesis, which is just to show the existence of exclusive and inclusive power are necessary to fully describe structure, but not in a uniform or necessary way, and not to argue that
some particular combination(structure and polity) is in fact a metaphysical or transcendent drive
or force, the formal cause of history and politic^.^ The paradigm of compositional power-exclusion and inclusion--then is just descriptive. The only exception to this is that it must be

e-g., as the strong over the weak in Hegel, Nietzsche. Also as capital over labor, white over black, and male over
female

For example, Giorgio Agamben's work on the ban and the state of exception as the hdamental and "originary"
act of Sovereign power seems to result in a metaphysical version of sovereign power that is much like composite
power. The ban concept is exclusionary in a complex way: it throws out the sacred man by first drawing him into
the law, and then negating his political life. He has no legal protection against being killed, yet cannot be executed.
"The structure drawn by this double exception is that of a double exclusion and a double capture, which represents
more than a mere analogy with the structure of the seve~eignexception."(82) Thus it is the symrpetry of exclusion
and inclusion. The essence of Sovereignty is this ban: "What is captured in the sovereign ban is a human victim who
may be killed but not sacrificed: homo sacer...The life caught in the sovereign ban is the life that is originarily
sacred--that is, that may be killed [by an individual, without recourse,] but not sacrificed [by the sovereign]--and, in
this sense, the production of bare life is the originary activity of sovereignty."(83) The relationship here is determined by the nature of organization--Sovereignty--and the composition is equally inclusive and exclusive from the
perspective of homo sacm
Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Stanford University Press: 1998.

state, a form of sovereign power instituted upon a particular home territory and a particular populace, limited by the territory and population of neighbors. We shall limit this discussion to European states, and only to later ones(c. 1650 onwards), just because that is the structure whose relationship we want to examine. So we can ignore the causal question all together, because we are
only looking to explain political power insofar as is necessary to define its structural implements.
This will be done'in association with particular organizational histories, but not explicitly
on that basis. It is not an historical examination, but rather an examination of the different theories about how power and polity have, and might still be able to, relate. 'Stage' and 'development' below only loosely refer to historical stage; they are not denoted by time so much as by the
particular model of power.
Now then, let us examine this compositional political power. The development of the
state as the basic political structure in Europe is the context in which composite power will be
conceived. The quantity of each mode of power, exclusionary and inclusionary, is the real measure of the general mode of political power of a certain state. In the development of the state,
there are three stages in which this quantity--referred to as the composition--is significantly different. The fvst occurs in the consolidation of central power in states, such as England and
France, during the so-called Age of Absolutism. In this stage power almost completely functions
exclusively and oppressively as the power of the king over his subjects. The second stage has a
more combined power--it is represented by liberalism, the Enlightenment, e.g., Rousseau's and
Locke's social contracn--dGta'ines. Power is beginning to shift into the inclusive mode, yet still - maintains some oppressive operation and the ability to exclude. The final stage is the contemporary one, which is virtually all inclusive, but as we shall see maintains some exclusivity.
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In each'of these stages, we will be considering two things: a general structure, and a particular conception of the subject citizenry. The particular form of power will be seen as the interaction of the subject with the structure. Thus, these stages are categories of historiography
which are associated with historical periods, but not explicitly historical. However, there are
other delineations of power modes as well, and in looking at some example historiography below
we shall see developments apart fiom that of the state.

The Exclusive Mode
Exclusionary power is the same as oppressive power. It is the power of domination and
exploitation. This stage of power has been characterized in numerous ways. It is what Foucault
discusses as the period where sovereignty is practiced explicitly:
"In certain societies, of which the feudal regime is only on example, it may be said that
individualization is greatest where sovereignty is exercised and in the higher echelons of
power. The more one possesses power or privilege, the more one is marked as an individual, by rituals, written accounts or visual representations. The 'name,' ...the performance
of deeds that demonstrate superior strength and are immortalized in writing,...the monuments or donations that bring survival after death,...the multiple, intersecting links of allegiance and suzerainty, all these are procedures of an 'ascending' indi~idualization."~

Under the practice of sovereignty, individual subjects are treated with objectifjring force. There is
little to becoming an individual, all it takes is the brute exercise of power in one of these manaxs+One's life is all but conceded to anyone who is overcome by the raw,powewf another.
With enough attention, this overcoming can be ritualized and elevated to a political status.

Michel Foucault. Discipline andpunish. Trans. Alan Sheridan. Random House, Inc., NY : 1977. pp.192-193
4-

A ruler who perhaps epitomized this type of sovereignty was Louis XIV(r. 1643-1715).

I-Ie undertook expansionist and religious warfare, gained control of the French nobility, and became the ostentatious center of French cultural life. His extravagant spending extended royal
patronage such that he became involved in the very production of culture and the spread of ideas.
The sovereign exercise of exclusive power is apparent in Louis' reaffirmation of France's alliance with Catholicism, when he revoked religious toleration in the Edict of Nantes in 1685.
"2. Our subjects of the Supposedly Reformed Religion are not to assemble for worship in
any place or house for any reason.

...
4. Ministers of the Supposedly Reformed Religion who have not converted are to leave the
kingdom within fifteen days and are not to preach or perform any functions in the meantime, or they will be sent to the galleys.

...
10.All subjects belonging to the Supposedly Reformed Religion and their wives and children are forbidden to leave the country or to send out their property and effects. The penalty for men is the galleys and women confiscation of their persons and pr~perty."~

Such decrees are in a sense enabled by the ritual power of the sovereign, and are rituals in themselves. We can see in this edict not only the sovereign enforcing the necessary constraints on the
populace to meet its foreign policy agenda, but also the rights over the individual in the ability to
take life, and the literal exclusion of one form of religious culture from the state. This is one
place exclusionary power is represented, in the edict.
4

It is the distribution of such rituals in society, following Foucault's definition, that form
the substance and create the structure of sovereignty. Under this structure, the subjugated are

From W~lliamBeik, Louis XIV & Absolutism: A Briefstudy with Documents. BedfordlSt.Martin's :2000.
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mere objects to which force can be applied. We can see, in this conception, another example: the
idea of ritualized racism. During the same historical period, mercantile imperialist economies
were the beginning in Europe. The Spanish in the Caribbean and South America, the French in
North America and West Africa, the English beginning their colonial empire. These enterprises
were state institutions, funded by revenues collected by the sovereign, using the military mechanism of which the sovereign was the head. The conquests of indigenous peoples became a necessary element to any European state, and indeed the riches won and the glory which emanated
became a ritual measure by which sovereign powcrs gauged themselves. The power exercised
over far away places, and over the instruments of the pursuit--the soldiers, natural resources, and
the booty--is explicitly oppressive. So, while colonialism may have been perpetrated for the
purpose of access to new resources, it was more for the fact of stealing actual wealth (and just
not resources, potential wealth), representing the sovereign's greatness, and the gluttony of increased ritualizing.
Thus, the power of the sovereign is really conceived in relationship to the structure of
sovereign action: it acts upon an objective substance--the body, the land, the populace--which it
conceives of as without power, and hence as without right. The subject of sovereignty is treated
such that one's sovereignty-potential (one's power) is the norm, and since there is but one
ritualization--namely, the state organ--there's just one center in which sovereignty can exist in a
particular society. All subjects are in a sense then evaluated for the sovereign potential (their
power like the sovereign's), b u - i ~ ~ u c l rdo
s e not have any portion, and hence are subject to
treatment similar to that of an enemy. Indeed, perhaps one explanation for why war on a populace did not really occur in the period of absolute rule is that it is the sovereign's right to domi-

nate his own subjects, but not to dominate the subjects of another sovereign power. The social
conception then is one which is based purely on power and the aggregation of it over time
through the immortalization of ritual. The king and the nobility are these aggregations in so-

ciety; since the subjects have no ritual honor they have no power in this social structure.

Transition: Exclusive Inclusion
The transition in the quality of composite power from exclusion to the beginnings of inclusionary mechanisms can be understood in several ways. First, as the entrance of rights and
equity into society in order to divest power from the center into a wider ruling class; privilege,
not just ritual power, becomes part of the scheme in evaluating society. Second, as the increase
of population density and the beginnings of mechanisms of population control which are simultaneously controlling yet somehow voluntary; liberal choice, rational and reasonable behavior,
and the idea of total individual responsibility become the basis for justification of social circumstances, away from the previous 'might makes right' mode of sovereignty. Third, as the displacement of a part of the sovereign's objective force to external localities, enabling the liberal
social change.
The first understanding concerns the divestment of sovereignty from a central monarchy
into a bourgeois political economy. Historically speaking, this occurred in the age of social contract philosophy and the revolutionary impulse to institute democratic governments to represent
the new fieeTGli of its populace and constitutions to codifl basic rights. This enabled-Zmem
of private property and markets to become the main means of economy and production. Under
this system, power became distributed along lines of wealth, which could be achieved more, ide-

ally speaking, by an individual's actions in the competitive market than by an inherited right. In
short then, power is conceived in terms of earnings and individual action, a revolution against
the ritualized system of sovereign power. Of course, the concept of ritual can still be applied, but
it begins to shift power from an honorific right to purchase power, the acquisition of money.

Capital and Labor

What begins in the transitional mode is the idea or a political economy that neutralizes
members of society into an economic scheme of productivity, savvy, profitability. In this
scheme, political power is first conceived in terms of a political economy; the privileged in this
system maintain control by a favored distribution of goods and property, replacing the explicit
domination of the sovereign structure, by including the means of oppression into the basic necessities of life. The basis of society becomes its mode of production, in which the populace must
participate.
Karl Marx's explanation of how the basic and fundamental operations of society are productive necessitates that the processes of industrialization in a nation-state ultimately create class

division within its population, and hence power, privilege, and a social structure of domination,
between those that are landedbrivate property) and control the means to social production, and
those that do not. I shall first proceed to show the Marxian view of production and how it specifies productivity as human labor, and the meeting of human needs.
To Marx, production is the defining characteristic of hwmmcieties, and is the foundational activity of society. This characterization is particularly intended for nations undergoing
industrialization, for a number of reasons which I will briefly mention. Industrialization creates

an increased division of labor in society as labor-power is applied to distributed tasks. The h n damental purpose of production is to meet the needs of society. Without going into specifics, the
basic idea is that the members of society participate in production to meet the needs of society,
instead of solely meeting their own needs. Since every person has a range of needs, and needs a
range of things, or "commodities", to meet them, there must be a distribution of specialized
labor-tasks in society in which the individual laborer produces a surplus of some particular socially necessary good. Instead of meeting his own set of needs, he works to meet one need that
is generally in everyone's set (is., the set of society's needs). But since his labor-power is only
applied in this specialized manner, and none is designated for the production of any other good
(i.e., he is within a division of labor), all of the remaining labor-power he has after producing the
socially necessary amount, all that he would use to meet his other needs, can be used to more effectively produce the exact same good, to meet the same need. Once his function becomes specialized, the one who controls his means of production and is the outlet for his labor-power can
reward him in smaller measure than he produced, because the social needs have been met.
We can naively construe this as the a co-opting of the working-day. Leisure time under a
framework of the individual meeting his needs would be available in this working day, because
he would simply be able to perform all the necessary tasks to allow him such "time". Even after
the set of these necessary tasks gets distributed to others, that is, once there is a set of common
necessary tasks and divisional sectors to do them, it is not necessary that the working day would
lengthen. That is, whether the meeting of?icdfis individual or social, the same point of necessity would hold, and it would not require a "full" working day from any person to meet everyone's needs.

In the more appropriate labor-power construction, the total labor-power expended in society would be nearly the same whether individuals met their own needs or produced socially
necessary goods. This amount, the integral amount of labor, is relatively independent of the
mode of production, as long as individuals do only what is necessary to meet the needs of their
own or society. All labor, according to Marx, is necessary only to a certain point. But, it is the
expropriation and division of labor, the creation of surplus value, and the codification of laborpower as labor-time by a monetary system that masks this point of necessity. Since it distributes
labor over time, and pays wages, it inflates the apparent cost of labor-power such that the wage is
is distributed over more time than is socially necessary. In this way the capitalist, he who controls the means to production, captures more labor-power than he pays for, and creates surplus
value.
In an ideal communist state, this is the elimination of exploitative labor, private property,
and the coercion of the political life of the individual by an ideology of surplus values and wealth
accumulation. This must be done on the basis of Marx's scientific assessment of the capitalist
mode of production. As conceived in Capital, coercion occurs upon both the capitalist and the
laborer: the first by his own greed and the necessity to increase profit against its natural decline,
the second by having been forced into alienating production by the necessity of selling his laborpower, which of course goes for less than its socially necessary value. For this reason it is an
ineficient political economy: it expends total productive power to beyond what is necessary to
meet the averagC~ocM-need.It must continue creatirg surpluses in value, which can only be--carried out by the exploitation of the propertyless, and hence the labor class increases in popula-

tion, yet decreases in real profit. This would theoretically,lead to more and more oppression of
the laboring population, an overt polarization 01society and an unstable situation.
However, before the scientific scrutiny of Capital and the more precise formulation of
this inefficiency, an ethical conception seems to have been guiding his entire view of what an
efficient and just political economy might be. In the first section of "Manuscripts", written in the
spring of 1844, he explains that the worker in a system of capital and private property is alienated from the product of his labor:
"This fact simply indicates that the object which labor produces, its product, stands opposed to it as an alien thing, as apower independent of the producer. The product of labor
is embodied and made objective in a thing ...The worker is at home when he is not working
and when he is working he is not at home. His work, therefore, is not voluntary but coerced, forced l a b o ~ " ~

Alienated labor is particularly despicable to him because "nature furnishes the means of lije...the
means of physical subsistence of the worker himself,"

In divorcing the laborer from production

and his own appropriation of these natural means, man is alienated from nature, from "himself,
his own active function," and from his species: "...[the worker] is acting freely only in his animal functions...while in his human function he feels only like an animal."7 He becomes homo
animalis from homo sapiens--a homofaber. Because capitalism exploits man's natural life activity it reflects a kind of moral inefficiency, a chronic and perpetual exclusion from natural life.

Lawrence H. Simon, ed. Karl Marx: Selected Writing. Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis: 1994. "Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts(Selections)." pp.56-97. (59)
Ibid, 60
Ibid, 62

Under these conditions life is struggle, and this seems to mean that individual and social life is
generally inhibited in its pursuit of the basic social good or any individual good.8
Some interesting biographical commentary has also been done that highlights relevant
early personal concerns. For example, J.E.Seige1 sees a strong connection between personal
struggle and social struggle. An essay written at age 17, "Reflections of a Youth on the Choice
of Vocation," reveals Marx's certainty that we have little choice of our circumstances in social
life, and how many of them are already determined at a young age. He is worried about choosing wrongly, and having one's mind struggle against the body's necessary duties in an unhappy
profession. He believed this would lead to an overall weakening of the individual? But even in
such a case, there is a greater struggle in overcoming that weakness in the service of a greater
good. "Marx felt an impulse to 'mock the rights' of his physical nature and lift himself above it,
to act 'with weakness and yet-with strength.'. .." Seigel connects this with the teleology in
Marx's view of historical development. " '[This is] Why,' Marx would declare on the eve of
1848, 'social reforms are never carried by the weakness of the strong, but always by the strength

of the weak.' " lo
The conclusion of this discussion of Marx's labor theory is that it shows precisely how
the capitalist model instituted during the liberal revolution is its own form of power, and institutes a power structure in society. Because the labor class will never be able to 'privilege its way
out' of the exploitative system, it must either depend on its own revolt or accept the status quo.
- -
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* The idea that individuals should pursue their own interests and happiness is not unique to liberal philosop&y.Indeed one of Marx's motivations was to free the laboring masses h m oppressive wage-labor precisely so individual
pursuits would not be excluded merely for lack of money.
J.E.Seige1, "Marx's Early Development," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 3 , No. 3. (Winter, 1973), pp.
475-508. (478)

Thus, in labor under capitalism there is at once inclusion into the market system by means
of money, wages, and the commodity, and exclusion by means of private property and the
means of production. The subject is included by the egalitarian conception of privilege (equal

because it is not a priori exclusive), but excluded by the fact of private control over property,
money, and the actual conditions privilege. Thus the relationship between the subject and the
social structure is one of a dual, composite power.

Once we understand the labor situation, the second transitional feature is apparent. This
is another effect power in liberal political economy. The neutral monetary and economic preplacement of the individual, in order to function, begins to create a certain kind of social good.
Since market-based social cooperation is necessary in this system, the cooperative impulse
within individuals must be instated. Those in whom it cannot be established must be contained
or controlled, and those in whom it is correctly established and autonomously active become society's successful and decent. The good in question is that which legitimizes the socialcooperative life, a kind of political life in that it exists solely as a result of the political economy
and structure; it is the norm.

Discipline and Normality
Foucault's analysis in Discipline and Punish is a brilliant effort to expose the operation of
the social good within the forniaiion of social structures. He goes about this in a novel way; he
does not attempt to identifj in particular social goods by means of companionate discourses and
transfer those discoveries to structure as it is found. Rather, he takes the existing structures

- ---.---...
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which form individuals exposes the techniques, arriving at a set fundamental aims: to make docile and productive individuals, to distribute individuals according to their productive

capacities(doci1ity-utility), to automate the norm under a morality and judgment which compels
social values and cooperation(panopticism),and to conceal these needs in a liberal ideology under a legal structure.
The first aim, to make docile bodies, is necessary to ensure the proceeding goals of productivity and normality. This is why he conceives of it as training. The docility of the body is
seen in a number of examples, and while there is some common structure to 'docility programs',
it is really a paradigm of case study is applicable in different ways. The common elements are
that institutions which have the need, or the task, of integrating bodies into complex machinations must undertake a regime of highly focused training. For example, the infantryman must be
fully integrated with his rifle, and this represents a broken down time: "the Prussian regulations
of 1743 laid down six stages to bring the weapon to one's foot, four to extend it, thirteen to raise
it to the shoulder, etc."ll He must be immediate in the complex of battlefield maneuvers, able to
execute an order immediately. Thus his activity his made more useful.
Space, as well as time, is used to contribute to productive organization. For example, a
system of ranking divorces organizational status from static spatial confines into a meaningful
distribution across space:
"In discipline, the elements are interchangeable, since each is defined by the place it occup-ies-.irl,ueries,and by the gap the separates it from the others. The [(military)] unifis,,,
therefore, neither the territory (unit of domination), nor the place (unit of residence), but
the rank: the place one occupies in a classification, the point at which a line and column

intersect, the interval in a series of intervals. Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for
the transformation of arrangement^."'^
The unit is arranged such that it takes absolute space and structures. The effect this has on the
individual within the space is to create as an internal product of the structure, without a pole or
externality: "It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but
distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations."
The effect of such techniques of controlling activity and the ranking of space is to induce
a ranking of the self within the individual. In this way training, and being situated within a structure, provides the means to automation and cooperation. It produces a normal type of psychology(with the aid of scientific psychology, of coursc) and perception of the space, rank and structure, and determines individual success.

Rank, then, is a form of status achieved by proper behavior within the military unit, and
is altogether the pursuit proper to 'good' soldiers, which is to say, normal soldiers. Generalize
this example unit to represent social organizations: what ranking in fact means is that the distribution of labor and compensation is for those who obey a certain normal pursuit in their range of
life.
Thus it is clear how the normal in fact becomes the good: by means of measured, structured advancement and reward, in which the rewarding system is not challenged. Such stability
is in fact the universal aim of the disciplinary society. It no longer epitomizes a gluttony of
wealth(not to say that p o w e h l individuals do not), but rather a stabilization of production and
T"
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normal conditions.

Now, the norm is maintained by means of the invested power of disciplinary training. As
regular needs of society are instituted--e.g., national defense, public health--it becomes necessary
to enforce the norm, and to protect it. Thus the model ofpanopticism, panoptic power, pervades
society.I3 It is an anonymous and pervasive watcher who can see all actions, and has the ability
to call out transgressions against the norm and discipline bad behavior. "Whenever one is dealing
with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used."I4 Foucault, in fact, thinks the basic logic of the
,panopticon operates in society's policing agencies, which are both political and moral, to maintain normality. The prison, for example, is the result of this social defense. The real power
though is not in its omniscience, but in the fact that it is internalized in every disciplined individual. The process of discipline requires such 'self-regulation'. Thus the watcher becomes part of
the subject, and it accounts for the scruples of the socially good.
This shows that the idea of social cooperation is in fact meant to play a certain role. The
norm represents a specific manner of cooperative activity, intentionally structured around integration and discipline. Behavior, scruples, and social morality are formed around the norm. Deviance from the norm then represents a "social problem." The modern problem, that is, the problem most associated with modernity and the modern state, is that the entire process by which a
"social problem" enters perception is designed to blur and distort that perception itself, to ultimately manufacture a type of perception which will lead to least resistance against the productive
.needs of society. A good illustratior, oE-tl& is the treatment of the mentally ill as socially threatening. In these cases, which are all too common, a mentally ill person crosses a normal boundl3

The model is Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon. See Foucault, DP: p.200.

l4 ibid., 205

ary of private property or personal space. Even if a crime was not explicitly committed, there is
still the expectation that he is unpredictable, and in the next instance of this he might harm
someone or himself. Thus he is perceived above all else to be a social threat(that is, "craziness"
becomes the only seeable characteristic); since the only recourse for us in handling a social threat
is judicial protection, he is either locked up or puts himself at risk to it. There is almost no hope
of treatment of course, because treatment mechanisms are not socially cost-effective. The paradigm of meta-identity and perception by which he was at first identified as "mentally ill" never
comes into question; ir it does it passcs out quite quickly by the dcsperate relicf of life and society defended, and the effete satisfaction that nothing else could be done.
The paradigm of normal and abnormal, of the good citizen and the threat-to-good is what
operates. Here, as in many places, normative knowledge becomes difference, difference becomes fear, fear becomes force. The created perception is thus both reduced from what was
prior, and increased in its systematic component; it takes situations of moral dissent, dissenting
intuitions or judgements, about social states and reduces the dissent by providing both a judgement and course of action that are socially endorsed and socially optimal.
For these reasons if we were to extensively examine the great many things threatening
our society, what we would have in fact is an excellent method for social self-examination. This
is in fact what Foucault. The normal obey the norm, the abnormal are censured, excluded, detained, etc. Since the most fundamental cooperative activity is the production of society's needs,
discipline is necessarily a h c t i o n of the means of its-production,and hence, there is a high de-ca---Z,

gree of productivity within any normality. Labor is normalized by the wage, the monetary form
of power which is market power and universally in society. Thus the structure of power rules

by inclusion into the disciplinary and productive system; it is necessarily exclusive of all
social threats it cannot control. Therefore we can see the composition of power arising out of

the integration of subject within the means of production. Modern composite power then is the
union of disciplinary power and the political economy of capitalism.

Now, the final point about the transition from explicit sovereign exclusion to the more
composite power model is that it was enabled by a seemingly contradictory action: namely, legitimate racial exploitation. When it in fact seemed that sovereign central powers were forced to
relinquish their power and divest it to the populace, what evolved was a system of exploitation
along racial lines in the colonies and under the slave trade. Effectively, the power of the sovereign was displaced from the white nation to a particular non-white group.

Contract and Displacement

The first sentence ofthe Charles Mills' The Racial Contract is: "White supremacy is the

unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today."15 His thesis is a rereading of the social contracts of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. The general point is that the
social contract, in every one of its forms, intentionally limited the extension of liberal ideas to
white people, despite the universalized tone, and in this way endorsed racism and exploitation

within the colonies. My point is that such legitimized racism enabled the liberal revolution for
-
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areasons: it let sovereigns to ~bjectilya new set of people, and h e n e r e k d their resistance
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to the divestment of power, and it provided the economic means to allow the new laissez-faire
system to flourish.
The immediate result of the liberal revolution, in regards to racism, was to create a social
ontology of "person" and "subperson." The exploitative slave trade and colonial empire of the
mercantile era had to be legitimized in some way by the enlightenment thinkers. There were the
awkward inventions of biological and religious racism, which held an intrinsic superiority in
whiteness and were explicitly racist. In social contract theory, the egalitarianism newly conceived had racial criteria--'equality among equals'. This means that:
"For blacks, the degradation of racial slavery..first acquired a color. Nonwhite subpersonhood is enshrined simultaneously with white personhood.. .For the colonial project, personhood would be raced."16
This distinction immediately excludes subpersons and licenses oppressive power. Now, 'black'
and 'white' are colored notions, but as Mills maintains, they really represent socially constructed
race categories. There is some nuance to the conflictual categories, but the main distinction is
that there is a definite "personness" along racial lines.
Mills says the racial contract is the truth of the social contract:
"The evolution of the modern version of the contract, characterized by an
antipatriarachalist Enlightenment liberalism, with its proclamations of the equal rights,
autonomy, and fieedom for all men, thus took place simultaneously with the massacre,
expropriation, and hereditary slavery of men at least apparently human."17

--

The racial contract then is the actual form of the social contract, because it limits the terms of the
*-

agreement to whites. He goes on to show how the social contracts of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau,
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and Kant all operate on a denial of various aspects of the political life of non-whites, and their
subperson stature. The point is the same throughout.
This, I-believe, enabled the revolution in Europe to succeed for the reasons mentioned
above. The contractarians endorsed the same objectifying power in the colonies as had the sovereign in the state. And furthermore, the economic benefit of the exploitative labor and colonial
trade reduced the constraints of power and struggle on the continent. By seizing territory, the
state gave trouble-making Huguenots, Puritans, Anabaptists, and criminals a legitimated outlet:
populate the colonies. The trade and manufactory system in the colonies operated under slave
labor or extremely cheap labor, providing material, some cheap goods, but also whole new markets for the goods manufactured in Europe. Hence, the endorsement of racial exploitation in the
colonies under the systems of slavery and manufactory afforded Europe the land it needed to expand(saving it perhaps from further conflict) and the economic boom to entrench capitalism.
Thus, the liberal state was able to rise by including non-whites into the territory and labor
system of imperial rule while excluding them from citizenship. In this way the sovereign

European states displaced their basic objectifling power; it did not disappear.

To conclude what the transition to a composite political power means then: we have
moved fiom an era where political structures were explicitly exclusionary to one which, on the
face of it, seeks to include all into an egalitarian power structure and political economy. Yet this
has turned out to be a m c r e l ~ i ainclusion,
l
since the egalitarianism has in fact been specialized in the number of ways described. Under the capitalist system, egalitarianism is conceived
of as equality of opportunity, and equality of the criterion for power--namely, purchase power.

------;;--.

However, it automatically excludes an entire class of people--the ones who are propertyless and
institutionally disadvantaged to become so. l8 Racial exploitation, which was originally legitimated in law, functioned under a special equality as well. It allowed only whites, who are in fact
not ethnically, biologically, or literally white but politically white, rape and enslave the uncivilized nether-peoples of the globe. Since this functioned to entrench liberal governments in the
proximity of liberal ideals, the equality of the social contract was not in fact equality. Under the
disciplinary system, the divested power of the ruler seems to have found its place. Yet, this system has instituted its own exclusion in the form of normality. While it has succeeded in breaking
out of the forced and coercive structure of power over the populace, it is in its own way coercive,
and should be recognized as a substantive form of inclusionary power.

Comprehensive Inclusion and Contemporary Liberalism
The final commentary I would like to offer is about the dream of ideal liberalism and creating an comprehensively inclusive democracy. If we examine social contract theories, what we
find is that the traditional core value is that of a universal position in which all subjects under
consideration, all who are signatories of the social contract, are said to be equal. The necessity

of this universality in creating general freedom, or perhaps generic freedom, as well justifying
state power, gives social contract theory the ability to give a new form of sovereignty, a kind of
practical absolutism--power, glory, and truth derived from mass cooperation, a general belief
that t h k ~ p t e r nis the highest and the best. This derives from the universalized

the

man" who signs over his natural freedom to society in order that it might be protected. The core

la

This is where the idea of welfare capitalism comes in.

of traditional social contract theory is that it assumes to represent the essential human quality of
its subject citizens, and thus is licensed, both by society and natural right, to have sovereign
powers.
In order to justify its sovereignty then, it must secure this universal contract. For the reasons given above, the traditional universality has been exposed for what it is: exclusive and not
universality at all. Motivated by an attempt to solve this problem, the contemporary social contractarian, John Rawls, advocated a system in which the greatest plurality of persons are guaranteed a place in the contract, called "justice as fairness". I-Ie updates the essential quality of man
in the universal position, which he calls the originalposition, to require the ability to exist within
a "reasonable pluralism" and participate in reasonable and rational social discourse. Behind a
hypothetical veil of ignor-ancewe want to determine what society our rational and reasonable self
would choose to live in, without knowing where our place in it might be. He concludes that we
would choose a constitutional democracy with a strong welfare system, in which public goods
are distributed to give the maximal least-benefit to the poorest, mainly on the basis that in our
rational choice, we would prefer to be poorest in such a system. lg

This system has some degree of promise, however, its fundamental problem is that it
places the requirements of his ideal 'reason' and 'rationality' upon signatories. In practice, this
means that people should more or less accept the status quo, with perhaps some minor welfare
adjustment, because it is derived from the ideal reasonable, rational agent in the original position.
Not accepting it would, at some level, be a subjection to a c m m s of irrationality and unreasonableness, and rejections as an illegitimate perspective and criticism. Thus Rawls' theory
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The actual details of the rational choice are more complicated.
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functions to justifjr all inequality by removing the historical facts of unfair distribution from the
colltractual society. Reparations, for instance, or affirmative action, would only be justified as
forms of welfare. This is problematic, because it does not address the core social problem of institutional causation of such inequality. It gives it the opportunity to gain somewhat, but only
under the conditions of social normality, as described earlier.
The individual who is to be included in society is cooperative, successful, and above all
normalized along an axis culled from the distributive scheme which best suits some particular
social liu.lction. I-Ie becomes the model individual. Under the model, the individual is one
whose being becomes increasingly linked to society, whose identity is malleable, whose morals
dictate integration and question the validity of social reform, who is reasonable and rational for
the sake of social discourse, and who participates in a productive scheme to increase social
goods. In short, these qualities are necessary for the determinate body of society to function.
They are systematically derived necessities, and are meant to prefigure a functional individuality,
individuality in the optimal position.
In conclusion then, we can see the matter on which inclusion operates. It removes all
'contentfrom the subject and refills him with the universal social good. In so doing, it de-

fines individuality, and hence predefines which individuals are meant to be in society, and which
are meant to be excepted from it. It determines what it means to be a person, which is the ability
to exist as ones' rationally and "universally" derived, or rather projected, signatory. Liberalism
thus appears to be proceeding towards-hd-usion by circumventing it: by inoreasingly forming
individuals into socially confluent, cooperative model citizens, created on the basis of universality, it is ever removing its need for exclusionary force.
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